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1. Introduction 
I have been invited to address any topic relating to emerging issues in international 
humanitarian law (IHL). When considering which subject to address, I decided to 
avoid a specific IHL topic, some of which are being addressed in depth during this 
symposium, but rather to take a step back and consider some of the more fundamental 
challenges that IHL is now facing.   
 
The most pressing challenge, in my opinion, is the trend of IHL being misused to 
justify killings which are of dubious legality under the law relating to the use of inter-
State force. The purpose of IHL is supposed to be to prevent avoidable death and 
destruction, not the reverse. I am thinking here primarily of the rise in targeted 
killings abroad of non-State actors, on the basis that these are justified as attacks on 
fighters in a non-international armed conflict. Such attacks have been facilitated by 
the increased availability of armed drones. It needs to be remembered that any 
practice that is acquiesced in by the international community can then easily be 
undertaken by other countries against targets that they perceive as threats. 
Furthermore, this trend is straining further the two classical IHL categories, into 
which various activities, such as UN operations and mixed conflicts, do not easily fit. 
There needs to be a serious reconsideration of whether it is possible to speak of “rules 
of armed conflict” without first classifying the violence as international or non-
international.  
 
The other topic I wish to address is a development which invites IHL specialists to 
seriously rethink the reasons why so many IHL rules are violated. Recent findings by 
human rights procedures have illustrated that a culture of human rights violations 
leads to serious humanitarian law violations. This has been indisputably proved in the 
area of violence against women. I am convinced that the same is the case for many 
other rules of IHL.  
 
These two seemingly unrelated topics have one point in common: the separation of 
IHL from other bodies of law, although technically accurate, can be an illusion in 
reality. The non-respect of other branches of international law can, and increasingly 
does, have a direct negative effect on a genuine respect of the purpose and spirit of 
IHL. Several branches of international law are important to achieve what IHL is 
intended to do, for example, certain aspects of environmental law, air law or cultural 
property law. However, for the purpose of this presentation, I will limit my comments 
to the law regulating inter-state force and human rights law. 
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2. Perverse effect on IHL by the non-respect of the rules limiting inter-State 
force  
 
Unrealistic expectations that IHL can compensate for violations of the UN Charter  
Everyone is aware of the degree to which Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter has been 
disrespected. With a few exceptions, such as Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and 
Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor, invading nations have for the most part got away 
with their aggression. Some have had to retreat due to military confrontation by the 
invaded nation, such as Russia in Afghanistan and Argentina in the Falklands, but for 
the most part wars have increasingly come to be seen as “inevitable”, even by 
international lawyers. It is my theory, which I cannot prove, that the progressive 
disrespect of the rules prohibiting force in the UN Charter has led to an increased 
acceptance by many nations, and other groups, of the use of force. The difficulty with 
which the crime of aggression was included in the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court is evidence to this effect. A serious low point, as far as the behaviour 
of western nations is concerned, was the bombardment of Kosovo in 1999 by NATO 
without a self-defence justification and without even a semblance of trying to get 
United Nations advance approval. Such a mentality helped pave the way for the 
invasion of Iraq in 2003, which was an egregious violation of the UN Charter.1  
 
All this has concentrated attention on the rules of IHL. I, like many others, have 
worked hard to make these rules known, and helped their modernisation to match 
developments in technology and new practices. However, IHL was never meant to 
solve political and social problems. The respect of its rules will not prevent the death, 
destruction, suffering and long-term misery, economic and otherwise, that armed 
conflict inevitably entails. Concentrating on IHL as the principal means to alleviate 
violence and horror is a major mistake, as this is to expect too much of what IHL can 
do. The decision taken by the ICRC in the late 1980’s to educate the general public in 
at least one fundamental rule of IHL, namely,  that civilians are not to be targeted, at 
least had the effect of newspapers reporting on this issue and human rights groups 
actively denouncing violations of IHL.2 I was very much involved in encouraging this 
development. However, the result is that many people now have the idea that any 
civilian casualties must mean that violations have occurred – which we know is not 
the case. Indeed, even in the case of the intervention in Libya, further to UN Security 
Council resolution 1973 in 2011, dozens of civilian casualties have been reported, 
even though the purpose of the mandate was to protect civilians.3 It should have been 
obvious to anyone that, even with the best of care, an air campaign was bound to 
                                                 
1
 Justifications based on prior UN Security Council resolutions do not stand up to scrutiny. Resolution 
1441 of 8 November 2002 did not authorise the use of force. Resolution 678 of 29 November 1990 was 
limited to autorisation to use force to remove Iraq from Kuwait. Resolution 687, of 3 April 1991, 
adopted after Kuwait was liberated, insisted that Iraq abandon all weapons of mass destruction. The 
only consequence, if this was not undertaken, was described in para. 22 of that resolution, namely, that 
the economic sanctions against Iraq would not be lifted. Furthermore, preambular para. 2 affirmed the 
“commitment  of all Member Stats to the sovereignty, integrity and political independence of …Iraq”. 
2
 See, e.g. R. Gutman and David Rieff  “Crimes of war : What the public should know”, Norton and 
Co. (1999). Since the 1990’s, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have regularly written 
reports on the respect or otherwise of international humanitarian law. 
3
 UNSC Res. 1973, 17 March 2011, para. 4. On civilian casualites, see C. J. Chivers and Eric Schmitt 
“In Strikes on Libya by NATO, an Unspoken Civilian Toll”, New York Tims, December 17, 2011. 
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result in civilian casualties as military activity was likely to occur near or in urban 
environments. Also, as the journalist David Rieff comments: 
 
“War, even when it is waged for a just cause and with scrupulous respect for 
international humanitarian law, always involves a descent into barbarism 
(think of the way Qaddafi died)”4 
 
With the possible exception of the short Falklands war in 1982, it is difficult to think 
of an exception to this observation.  
 
In other words, IHL cannot take the place of the original intention of the UN Charter 
which was to prohibit the use of armed force against other nations. The purpose of the 
self-defence exception in Article 51 was to allow an invaded nation (inevitably 
illegally invaded) to defend itself until the Security Council took over using Chapter 
VII. We all know that the blockage in the Security Council until 1989 prevented this, 
but the end of this state of affairs should have enabled the original purpose of the 
United Nations to be implemented. As the preamble of the UN Charter makes clear, in 
order to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”, it is necessary to 
“practice tolerance”, to ensure that “armed forces shall not be used, save in the 
common interest” and, most importantly, to “employ international machinery for the 
promotion of the economic and social advancement of peoples”.5  Although some 
efforts have been made to this effect, the logic of power politics has still held sway.  
 
The on-going result is the continued use of force by governments, non-State groups 
and criminals (whether labelled terrorists or not) and the perception that this is the 
way to solve problems. It is not. Armed force is very good at capturing or re-capturing 
territory, or repelling an armed attack, but, in my opinion, that is all. IHL rules are 
logical and effective for the purpose of capturing territory efficiently with the least 
possible destruction and loss of life. The rules were developed against such a 
background and still make perfect sense in that context. However, it needs to be 
properly questioned whether killing members of terrorist groups will actually make 
that terrorism go away.6 Certainly I know that it was not the use of force in Northern 
Ireland that finally solved the problem of resentment and associated violence, but 
rather the very difficult process of achieving sufficient mutual understanding between 
the groups to agree to a genuine peace process. 
 
It is against this background that I am voicing serious concern about the process by 
which violations of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter have been justified by using IHL. 
Targeted killings against suspected terrorists abroad have been justified on the basis 
that there is an armed conflict with Al Qaida and associated groups. As such their 
members are to be seen as fighters that can be targeted. As these groups do not 
represent a State, and there is understandably no intention of according POW status to 
any that might be captured, the conflict has been classified as a non-international one. 
                                                 
4
 David Rieff, “R2P, R.I.P” (commenting on the negative effect of using force under the 
“Responsibility to Protect” banner, using the intervention in Libya as an example), International Herald 
Tribune, November 8, 2011.  
5
 United Nations Charter, preamble,  paras. 1, 5, 7 and 8. 
6
 The result can indeed be the reverse. See comments to this effect in two articles published in the 
International Herald Tribune on 15 April 2010 : Mark Medish and Joel McCleary, “Assassination 
season is open”, and Robert Wright, “The high cost of political killing”. 
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This justification is an abuse of IHL. In fact it is the very acceptance of such use of 
force on another State’s territory as a non-international conflict that I consider to be a 
major mistake. Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions was motivated by the desire 
to introduce basic IHL rules to protect persons not, or no longer, taking part in 
hostilities during civil wars. This is abundantly clear not only from the wording of 
that article (“in the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring 
in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties”), but also from the 
Commentary to this provision. The discussion of delegates during the negotiation of 
this Article spoke exclusively of insurgents resisting the incumbent government inside 
a single State.7 Furthermore, the rules within the article refer exclusively to the 
protection of those in the hands of the other party to the conflict, including an 
obligation to collect and care for the sick and wounded. Targeting someone in another 
country through the exclusive use of drones or other air power makes it automatically 
impossible to respect these provisions. Article 3 was clearly never meant to apply to 
such a situation.  
 
Although this point is relevant for any cross-border operations using air power, there 
is a greater danger now that the acquisition of drones has increased exponentially. 
Even Iran has just shown off its first domestically-built armed drone with a range of 
620 miles.8 Although the argument in favour of drones is that the operators can take 
more care on accurate targeting than a stressed pilot,9 there is also no doubt that 
drones could create a huge temptation for many States to use force against targets in 
other countries.10 Their own armies would not be put at risk. As they are manipulated 
through computer, it would not necessarily be evident where the attack originated 
from (unless drones display the national flag as aircraft are required to do under 
customary rules). In fact we are on the edge of what could be a descent into a 
nightmare if firm measures are not taken to insist on the importance of the prohibition 
of the use of force. Insisting that such cross-border activities are not non-international 
actions needs to be part of this effort. 
 
Re-interpretation of “non-international conflict” as a result of the deterioration of the 
rules prohibiting the use of force 
The approach that seems to have been adopted in recent years is to classify any 
conflict that is not inter-governmental as non-international. I can see the semantic 
logic of this, but it is not the intention of Article 3. Kenneth Anderson dates the 
abusive use of Article 3 to the judgment of the US Supreme Court in the Hamden case 
which applied this article to the treatment of Guantanamo detainees, thereby implying 
that it can apply to “a borderless terrorist group”.11 As he says in that article, it would 
have simply been better to insist on the application of minimum standards. In 1949, 
Article 3 provided the only binding legal standards for the protection of detained 
                                                 
7
 See, e.g. ICRC Commentary to Geneva Convention 1, (ed. Pictet), 1952, pp.49-50 ; Commentary to  
Geneva Convention II, (ed. Pictet) 1960, p. 33 ; Commentary to Geneva Convention III, (ed. Pictet),  
1960, pp. 35-37; Commentary to Geneva Convention IV (ed. Pictet), 1958, pp. 35-36. Extending the 
interpretation to include non-governmental forces fighting each other within a State does not 
undermine either the language of the provision or its main intention and is therefore acceptable. 
8
 “Iran unveils first Bomber Drone”, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east, 22 August 2010. 
9
 See, e.g. arguments to this effect by Jack Beard, “Law and War in the Virtual Era”, AJIL, July 2009, 
Vol. 103, No. 3, pp. 409-445, at pp. 431-433. 
10
 Also admitted by Beard, ibid. at p. 443. 
11
 Kenneth Anderson, “More Predator Drone Debate, in the Wall Street Journal, and What the Obama 
Administration Should Do as a Public Legal Position”, January 9, 2010, http://volokh.com/2010/01/09. 
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persons, whereas now human rights law and more recent treaty and customary IHL 
are the relevant sources. The other reason why common Article 3 is not the proper 
source is the standard required for that article to apply, namely, the organisation of 
rebel forces and the intensity of fighting.12 The intensity criterion is not normally met 
with most terrorist attacks. As the commentary to common Article 3 says:  
 
“it must be recognised that the conflicts referred to in Article 3 are armed 
conflicts, with armed forces on either side engaged in hostilities – conflicts, in 
short, which are in many respects similar to an international war, but take 
place within the confines of a single country”.13  
 
It is my view that the misuse of Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions has been made 
possible by the dangerous deterioration of the interpretation of Articles 2(4) and 51 of 
the UN Charter. The purpose of separating the jus ad bellum from the jus in bello was 
to ensure that invaded nations could not argue that, as they had been the victim of 
aggression, IHL should not apply to them. As the ICRC needs to remain neutral as to 
which party is responsible for an aggression, it avoids addressing the jus ad bellum. 
However, it is a mistake for other international lawyers to treat IHL as totally 
divorced from the effects of how force is used and the justification given for it. Non-
ICRC personnel may and indeed should publicly comment on whether such 
justifications are acceptable.  
 
If we are to avoid a world of increased anarchy, violence and chaos, it is important to 
understand how we have got to a situation where many States seem to be accepting, or 
at least not vociferously objecting to, the killing of hundreds (maybe thousands) of 
people on another continent, supposedly in the absence of an international armed 
conflict. As commented on by John Bellinger III: 
 
“For several years, U.S. allies have made no public comment even as U.S. 
drone strikes have killed twice as many suspected al-Qaida and Taliban 
members than were ever imprisoned in Guantanamo Bay”.14 
 
The trend towards a regression from the standards in the UN Charter has been well 
described by Christian Tams, in his article entitled “The Use of Force against 
Terrorists” published in the European Journal of International Law.15 This article 
describes the fact that until the end of the 1980’s it was the accepted view of the vast 
majority of States,16 supported by the International Court of Justice,17 that the 
interpretation of Article 51 of the UN Charter was to be interpreted restrictively. In 
this regard, note was taken of the deliberate difference between the words “any use of 
                                                 
12
 See, e.g. the definition of a non-international armed conflict in the ICTY Trial Chamber case of 
Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Balaj and Brahimaj, 3 April 2008, Case No. IT-04-84-T, paras. 37-60.  
13
 See, e.g., ICRC Commentary to Geneva Convention III, (ed. Pictet),  1960, p 37. 
14
 John Bellinger III“Drones and world opinion”, Washington Post and International Herald Tribune, 
October 5, 2011. John Bellinger III was legal adviser for the US State Department from 2005 to 2009 
and at the time of writing the article was an adjust senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. 
The statement, therefore, cannot be in the nature of a mere allegation. 
15
 Christian J. Tams “The Use of Force against Terrorists”, EJIL (2009), Vol. 20, No. 2, 359-397. 
16
 See ibid. p. 363, in which Tams cites UNGA resolutions 2131, 2625, 3314 and 42/22. Also ibid. p. 
367, where he points out that attempts by a few States to justify attacks on terrorists in another country, 
using self-defence as a justification, were always rejected by the international community. 
17
 Tams cites, in particular, the Corfu Channel (1946) and Nicaragua (1986) Judgments, ibid, p.363.  
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force” in Article 2(4) and “armed attack” in Article 51. The term “armed attack” in 
that article had to be one undertaken by a State directly. If it was undertaken by a non-
State actor, it had to be attributable to another State, i.e. effectively controlled by it.18 
Additionally, the International Court of Justice stressed in the Nicaragua case and the 
more recent Oil Platforms case (2003) that attacks would need to reach a certain 
threshold of violence in order to trigger the right of self-defence.19 This means, 
therefore, that for the vast majority of terrorist activity, the use of force could not be 
justified by the doctrine of self-defence. This was the view of the vast majority of 
States also, despite the fact that they had been at the receiving end of terrorism for 
decades. Counter-terrorism treaties concentrated on co-operation in criminal 
prosecution and other non-forcible measures, as the majority of States feared that 
allowing the use of force against terrorists would inevitably “invite abuse”.20 
 
As regards the position in the present day, States still refer to self-defence as the 
justification for the use of force against terrorists, and the International Court of 
Justice has not changed its opinion on its meaning. However, since the 1990’s, States 
seem less keen to criticise an attack against non-State actors abroad. In his article, 
Tams referred not only to the general acceptance of the use of force against 
Afghanistan further to the 9/11 attacks,21 but also to the lack of criticisms of resort to 
the use of force against certain groups in a number of other cases, e.g. by Turkey 
against the PKK in Iraq, by Russia against Chechen bases in Georgia, etc.22 He noted 
that many of these actions were more in the nature of reprisals or self-help than 
traditional concepts of self-defence.  Furthermore a lot of the attacks by terrorists 
could not be said to have been controlled by the State they were based in. Tams 
suggested, therefore, that a better way to understand contemporary State practice is to 
recognise that the level of attribution required has changed from one of control to one 
of “complicity in the activities of terrorists based on its territory”, in other words, a 
form of “aiding and abetting” the terrorists’ conduct.23 He was of the view that this 
development had occurred because of the international community’s determination to 
fight terrorism, but at the same time he recognised it risked abuse. In particular, if in 
the future States were to generally accept an accumulation of small attacks as a basis 
for the use in self-defence, this would, undermine “the temporal dimension of self-
defence” and risk “turning a temporal right into an open-ended licence to use force”.24 
                                                 
18
 Ibid. pp. 368-369. 
19
 Ibid. p. 387. 
20
 Ibid. p. 373. 
21
 Serious concern about the unilateral use of force against non-State actors abroad was already voiced 
by Antonio Cassese in 2001. He pointed out, in particular, that Security Council resolution 1638, 
adopted shortly after the attacks of 9/11, was “ambigious and contradictory” because although the 
preamble referred to the right of self-defence, operative paragraph 1 referred only to a “threat to peace” 
and not an “armed attack”. The seeming acceptance of unilateral action without a Security Council 
authorisation meant that States assimilated “a terrorist attack by a terrorist organisation to an armed 
aggression by a state, entitling the victim state to resort to self-defence”. A. Cassese, “Terrorism is 
Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories of International Law”, EJIL (2001), vol. 12, No. 5, pp. 
993-1001, at pp. 996-7. 
22
 Tams. pp. 378-381. Other examples include force by Columbia against members of the FARC in 
Ecuador, by Rwanda, Tajikistan and Burma who responded to cross-border attacks by rebels by 
moving their troops into neighbouring States, and by Israel against Hezbollah in Lebanon. Criticism of 
Israel’s action in 2006 concentrated on its disproportionate use of force, rather than the decision to 
resort to the use of force. 
23
 Ibid. pp. 385-387. 
24
 Ibid. p. 389. 
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He didn’t think that this had yet occurred but that there was a risk that it could. In this 
article Tams hoped, therefore, that Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, 
“which has turned into a self-perpetuating military campaign serving a range of 
objectives…will remain an isolated deviation from the general rule”.25 
 
This article was published in 2009. It is evident that the “deviation” described by 
Tams was not temporary, at least not in the light of the targeted killing policy of the 
present U.S. administration. The rationale for the policy is described by John Belliger 
III in the following manner: 
 
“The United States believes that drone strikes are permitted under 
international law and the United Nations Charter as actions in self-defence, 
either with the consent of the country where the strike takes place or because 
that country is unwilling or unable to act against an imminent threat to the 
United States… 
…Obama administration officials have explained…that strikes against militant 
leaders are permissible, either because individuals are part of the overall U.S. 
conflict with Al-Qaida or because they pose imminent threats to the United 
States…” 
 
He adds, however, that: 
 
“No other government has said publicly that it agrees with U.S. policy or legal 
rationale for drones. European allies, who vigorously criticised the Bush 
administration for asserting the unilateral right to use force against terrorists in 
countries outside Afghanistan, have neither supported nor criticised reported 
U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. Instead, they have largely 
looked the other way…”26  
 
It is my theory that one of the major reasons why the rules prohibiting recourse to the 
use of force have been allowed to lapse to such a degree is that there are no significant 
non-governmental organisations dedicated to criticising violations. There can be no 
doubt that the amount of attention to international human rights law and to IHL is 
thanks to the efforts of such organisations. However, most human rights organisations 
do not address the issue of the validity of any particular inter-state force under the 
rules of the UN Charter, for reasons that do not seem particularly convincing to me.27  
 
Various elements are relevant to this situation: is the justification given by the U.S. 
government a reflection of present law? Should it be in the light of the potential 
implications? What is its effect as far as IHL is concerned? 
 
 
                                                 
25
 Ibid. 390. 
26
 John Bellinger “Drones and world opinion”, Washington Post and International Herald Tribune, 
October 5, 2011 
27
 The International Commission of Jurists (of which I was Secretary-General at the time) was one of 
the very few organisations that published a view that the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was illegal. I consider 
it also appropriate that Philip Alston, the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary 
executions, also addressed the issue of the use of inter-state force in his Study on Targeted Killing : UN 
Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6, 28 May 2010, paras. 34-45. 
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Evaluation of the stated rationale for attacks on individuals abroad 
An increased acquiescence to such strikes on non-State actors, including individuals, 
in another State’s territory could in due course adjust customary law to allow for 
them. The actual legal rationale, however, remains unclear.28  
 
Attacks with the consent of the government may, at first sight, seem a reasonable 
justification, but there are two potential problems. The first is that a State has human 
rights obligations towards those within its jurisdiction and normally extra-judicial 
executions are a violation of the right to life. Only if a person is a threat to life and it 
is impossible to arrest him or her before that person takes another life, is lethal force 
possible. Asking or allowing another State to attack such a person outside such a 
situation is a violation of its human rights obligations, and the attacking State is 
complicit in the violation. It may be argued that the situation would be different if the 
State in which the attack is to take place is in a non-international armed conflict and 
the person concerned is one of the insurgent fighters. From an IHL point of view this 
would not be problematic as such, but it could amount to unlawful interference in the 
internal affairs of another State. In an article I wrote some time ago for the British 
Yearbook of International Law,29 I argued that if a government is in difficulty because 
of an insurrection, it may not lawfully call on another State to aid it. This conclusion 
was based on the fact that all governments who requested outside help justified the 
request on the basis of self-defence, alleging that the rebels were encouraged and 
helped by another State (I have not seen any change in State practice in this regard). If 
a government no longer has control of a State because of a serious insurrection, it 
should no longer be seen as the sole representative of that State.30 
 
The second basis articulated for such attacks is that the State in which the non-State 
actor is based is “unable or unwilling” to stop the threat to another State. This ground 
seems to be accepted by some commentators albeit within strict limits.31 Cassese, for 
example, pointed out that the network of cells making up Al-Qaida was based in 
about 60 States. These individuals were therefore involved, in one form or another, in 
aiding or abetting the attacks of 9/11. It could hardly be accepted that all the countries 
in which these individuals operated could be subject to attack, not without risking a 
third world war. He suggested, therefore, limiting any action in self-defence to an 
attack on terrorist headquarters, which in this case was considered to be in 
Afghanistan. Further he stressed the need to bring alleged terrorists to justice as well 
as to go beyond repressive measures. He pointed out that the long-term perspective 
                                                 
28
 For a summary of various explanations, and the difficulties associated with them, see: Nils Melzer, 
“Targeted Killing in International Law”, OUP, 2008, pp.51-55.  
29
 Louise Doswald-Beck “The Legal Validity of Military Intervention by Invitation of the 
Government”, BYIL, 1985, pp. 189-252. 
30
 Ian Brownlie, writing in 1960, was already of the view that such justfication was dubious : he 
considered that a government giving support to a beliegered regime was objectionable because of the 
principles of self-determination and non-interference in internal affairs, and because of the danger of 
making an internal armed conflict an international one : Ian Brownlie, “International Law and the Use 
of Force by States”, OUP, 1963, p. 327. The book was based on his thesis that he completed in 1960. 
31
 E.g. Philip Alston “Study on targeted killings”, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, 
summary or arbitrary executions, 28 May 2010, UN Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6, paras. 35-41; Chatham 
House “Principles of International Law on the Use of Force by States in Self-Defence” (Chatham 
House Principles), Doc. ILP WP 05/01, October 2005, Principle 6. The Chatham House Principles 
were the result of a study to provide a statement on the rules of international law governing the use of 
force in self-defence. The participants were present and former principal legal advisers to the UK 
Foreign Office as well as leading British specialists in international law. 
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has to address social inequalities, poverty, ignorance and other endemic problems that 
lie at the root of terrorism.32 This point has been recognised by the UN Global 
Counter-Terrorism Strategy which includes “Measures to address the conditions 
conducive to the spread of terrorism”.33 
 
Reasons to maintain the traditional post-Charter interpretation of self-defence 
There are a number of reasons why drone attacks against individuals are a problem 
from both a legal and practical point of view. First, the covert nature of drone attacks 
means that it is probably impossible to evaluate the validity of intelligence 
information that underpinned the decision to use force. The likelihood of mistakes is 
high.34  
 
Secondly, given that IHL governing international conflicts should apply, attacks have 
to be limited to military objectives, to combatants (if any)35 and to persons taking a 
direct part in hostilities (which would probably be the terrorists here).  
Notwithstanding the Interpretative Guidance of the ICRC on the term “Direct 
Participation in Hostilities”, this still allows a degree of latitude in its practical 
application.  
 
Thirdly, although it may be argued that such attacks are discrete events and aimed at 
dangerous individuals, their effects should not be underestimated. There appears to be 
no clear indication of how many innocent persons are killed or injured in these attacks 
or how proportionality is assessed in advance. Additionally, many people suspected of 
giving information to those responsible for such attacks are murdered, as they are 
considered to be collaborators by members of the local population.36 This should not 
come as a surprise; it is indeed to be expected. 
 
Fourthly, if a departure is made from the strict interpretation of “armed attack”, then 
quite a range of persons could be seen as targetable by some States. Many States, 
unfortunately, define “terrorism” in quite a lax way as covering anyone who disagrees 
with State policy. An example of this is the Syrian government who labels as 
“terrorists” those demanding change through protest. Several regional treaties are 
frighteningly lax in their interpretation of “terrorism”.37 The argument that people 
demanding change are being supported from abroad remains common – it is not 
beyond imagination that persons based abroad encouraging democratic change could 
be seen as a valid target.  
                                                 
32
 A. Cassese, “Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories of International Law”, 
EJIL (2001), vol. 12, No. 5, pp. 993-1001, at pp. 999-1001. 
33
 UNGA Res. 60/288 and Annex, 8 September 2006. 
34
 One needs only to consider the number of persons held in Guantanamo who turned out to be 
innocent. In July 2005 British police thought they were killing a suicide bomber in London;  the victim 
was an innocent Brazilian electrician. 
35
 If the so-called terrorists are acting on behalf of the State, then they could be combatants if they 
conform to the criteria in Article 4 of Geneva Convention III or Article 43 of Additional Protocol I for 
States party to that treaty. 
36
 In the case of Afghanistan,  death squads  kill suspected collaborators, including those considered to 
have given information enabling the choice of targets for drone attacks : Ray Rivera, Sharifullah Sahak 
and Eric Schmitt “A new terror in Afhanistan: Death Squads” International Herald Tribune, November 
30, 2011. 
37
 E.g. Treaty on Cooperation among the States Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
in Combating Terrorism, 1999, Art. 1; Convention of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference on 
Combating International Terrorism 1999, Art. 1 para.2.  
Copyright 2012. Louise Doswald-Beck. All rights reserved. 
 
 10 
 
At the other end, civilians that are firing the drones are most certainly taking a “direct 
part in hostilities” and therefore a valid target under IHL. This further weakens the 
distinction between combatants and civilians. A rather radical way round this problem 
is suggested by Kenneth Anderson. After having correctly noted that attacks on Al-
Qaida abroad cannot be classified as a non-international armed conflict, he proposes 
avoiding IHL altogether by going back to traditional notions of self-defence. As he 
puts it: 
 
“Self-defense gives the discretionary ability to attack anywhere in the world 
where a target is located, without having to make claims about a state of 
armed conflict everywhere and always across the world”38 
 
If I understood this correctly, this would mean that military action in self-defence 
against terrorist groups would exclude the application of IHL because such action 
would not be an “armed conflict”.  This suggestion is very similar to notions of 
“measures short of war” that were common as justifications for the use of force prior 
to 1914. As described by Ian Brownlie in his very well researched book on the use of 
force, “war” in the past depended on the intention to be in a state of war.39 States 
which wanted to avoid the rules that were required for “war” argued another ground, 
such as self-defence, self-preservation, necessity or self-help. His analysis showed 
that these grounds were in reality not distinct, were used by States whenever 
convenient and did not in practice reflect a rule of law.40 Suggestions to go back to 
such a scenario do not fill one with confidence – after all, the first half of the 
twentieth century was not exactly known for its peaceful nature! The 1949 Geneva 
Conventions specifically apply to armed conflicts, whether a state of war is 
recognised or not,41 precisely to avoid this situation.  
 
A similar argument to that of Ken Anderson is made by Solon Solomon. He doesn’t 
suggest avoiding IHL altogether, but proposes that actions violating IHL should be 
acceptable if such actions are in keeping with the right of self-defence. Using the 
example of Gaza, he accepts that the economic sanctions that were imposed on Gaza 
could arguably be seen as amounting to “collective punishment”, which is prohibited 
under IHL, but which should be seen as an acceptable self-defence measure that is 
better than open hostilities.42 
 
I’m not sure which proposal is more troubling – suggesting that IHL doesn’t apply at 
all, or that it does but that violations should be considered not a problem if the action 
can be justified under self-defence. Both try to avoid IHL because it is perceived as 
too restrictive. Suggesting self-defence as a justification instead presupposes a fairly 
generous interpretation of this term, which is not in keeping with how this has been 
                                                 
38
  Kenneth Anderson, “More Predator Drone Debate, in the Wall Street Journal, and What the Obama 
Administration Should Do as a Public Legal Position”, January 9, 2010, http://volokh.com/2010/01/09. 
 
39
 Ian Brownlie, “International Law and the Use of Force by States”, OUP, 1963, p. 38. 
40
 Ibid. pp. 41-48. 
41
 Art. 2 common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
42
 Solon Solomon, “The Great Oxymoron: Jus in Bello Violations as Legitimate Non-Forcible 
Measures of Self-Defense: The Post-Disengagement Israeli Measures towards Gaza as a Case Study”, 
9 Chinese Journal of International Law (2010), 501-536. 
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interpreted by the International Court of Justice and traditionally understood within 
the regime of the UN Charter. 
 
Solomon’s article does, however, unintentionally highlight the problem with the 
premise that force can create security. He recalls that after the disengagement of Israel 
from Gaza in 2007, Israel restricted the passage of persons and reduced the supply of 
electricity and fuel in the hope that this would pressure the Palestinians into halting 
rocket attacks. As we know, the policy did not have this effect – rather it just 
increased the degree of resentment of those subjected to this treatment. The decades 
of security measures taken by Israel have not significantly improved the situation 
because the basic problem of self-determination has not been properly resolved.  
 
This leads me back to the point that forcible counter-terrorism measures are not the 
way to solve the problem and in reality are more likely to create more resentment and 
hatred in the communities affected by the attacks. Loosening the standards of the UN 
Charter is not the way forward. Peace-building is hard work, unspectacular, long and 
mostly undertaken behind the scenes. But it is the only effective way to peace in the 
long term. It is also achievable – Western Europe after the Second World War attests 
to this. 
 
In order to avoid an abusive use of the doctrine of self-defence as a justification for 
attacks on non-State actors in other countries, a group of leading international lawyers 
in Britain undertook an analysis of how the right to self-defence is to be interpreted. 
The result is a document called the “Chatham House Principles” published in 2005. 
These reaffirm the International Court of Justice’s insistence that using force in self-
defence can only be further to a large-scale attack, and only to the degree to avert or 
end this attack.43 They also insist that “force may only be used when any further delay 
would result in an inability by the threatened state effectively to defend against or 
avert the attack against it” and that such “force may be used only on a proper factual 
basis and after a good faith assessment of the facts”.44 These Principles make the 
point that “[t]errorist organisations are not easily rooted out by foreign armed 
forces.”45  
 
The result of these conditions is that such force will only be legitimate in exceptional 
cases and certainly not as an on-going activity. The correct treatment of such force as 
an international conflict, and not a non-international conflict, will mean that for 
parties to Additional Protocol I, the full range of provisions will apply. Not 
surprisingly the Chatham House Principles also confirm that forcible action in self-
defence “must conform with the rules of international humanitarian law governing the 
conduct of hostilities”.46 
 
IHL qualification of attacks on non-State actors abroad 
As far as the qualification of an attack on non-State actors in another country is 
concerned, the first point to be made is that such an attack is a “use of force against 
the territorial integrity” of a State within the meaning of Article 2(4) of the UN 
                                                 
43
 “Principles of International Law on the Use of Force by States in Self-Defence” (Chatham House 
Principles), Doc. ILP WP 05/01, October 2005, Principle 6. 
44
 Ibid. Principle 4. 
45
 Ibid. commentary to Principle 6, p. 13. 
46
 Ibid. Principle 7. 
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Charter.47 Logically it seems evident that the conflict is an international one. This 
point is confirmed by the definition of aggression in General Assembly resolution 
3314, which is probably going to be used for the interpretation of this term in the 
Statute of the International Criminal Court.48 That definition includes the: 
 
“Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another 
State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another 
State”49 
 
When I was at the ICRC, such an action was always accepted as reflecting an 
international armed conflict. However, it appears to be the case that many IHL 
specialists are going along with assertions that attacking armed groups in another 
State is a non-international armed conflict because the attack was not aimed at 
government troops.50 Going along with this thinking is accepting dangerous 
propaganda which further weakens the rule against the use of force. The attack on 
Lebanon in 2006, for example, which Israel asserted was aimed only at Hezbollah, 
was certainly felt by the government of Lebanon to be an attack on the State of 
Lebanon.51 Drone attacks which occur in Pakistan are certainly felt by the government 
as an attack on the State. The situation of Gaza should be a good illustration of the 
opportunistic classification of attacks on another territory depending on the ends 
sought. The Israeli authorities consistently classified attacks on Hamas in Gaza as 
attacks on a terrorist group. However, in the context of the Palmer Inquiry on the 
Flotilla incident, Israel justified its blockade of Gaza on the basis that it was involved 
in an international conflict, 52 as only in such conflicts can blockades be lawfully 
created.  
 
A further reason for maintaining the classification as an international armed conflict is 
the reasoning behind the “unwilling or unable” justification for attacks on terrorist 
groups abroad. The commentary to Principle 6 of the Chatham House Principles 
explains that it “may be that the state is not responsible for the acts of terrorists, but it 
is responsible for any failure to take reasonable steps to prevent the use of its territory 
as a base of attacks on other states”.53 This reasoning reinforces the fact that the attack 
is on the State. 
 
3. Consideration of whether IHL needs to be limited to an international/non-
international armed conflict dichotomy 
The problem relating to the classification of attacks on non-State actors in other 
countries is just another manifestation of the fundamental problem with the traditional 
                                                 
47
 Confirmed in Chatham House Principles, commentary to Principle 6, at p. 12. 
48
 Following resolution RC/Res.4, adopted on June 11, 2010 by the States party to the ICC Statute, the 
crime of aggression was defined by reference to UNGA Res. 3314. The new Article 8 bis, containing 
this definition, will be included in the Statute further to a decision in 2017 by the States party to the 
ICC.  
49
 Definition of Aggression, UNGA Res. 3314 (XXIX), 14 December 1974,  Art. 3 (b).  
50
 See ibid.where an attack on the armed forces of another State is another alternative in para. 3 (d). 
51
 The assertion that this was a non-international armed conflict was even more bizarre given that 
Hezbollah was part of the government and was the accepted local government  authority in  southern 
Lebanon. 
52
 Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Inquiry on the 31 May 2010 Flotilla Incident, September 
2011, para. 47. 
53
 Chatham House Principles, commentary to Principle 6, at p. 12. 
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dichotomy of international or non-international armed conflict. There are so many 
mixed conflicts these days, as well as those involving the use of force by international 
organisations including the UN, that it makes sense to consider whether there could be 
another alternative. The following is not intended to be a magic formula that I have 
come up with, but rather a suggestion of how the issue could be thought about from a 
different angle. 
 
 Until recently it was fairly clear that there were far fewer rules for non-international 
conflicts and therefore the classification was of great importance. However, when 
evaluating State practice for the purpose of the customary law study,54 it was clear 
that a major change began to take place in the 1990’s. States regularly insisted on 
basic rules, until then mostly associated only with international armed conflicts, for all 
types of conflicts. This was especially the case as regards the condemnation of attacks 
on civilians and of indiscriminate attacks. The result was that by the beginning of 
2002 (the time until which we collected material), there was sufficiently dense, 
widespread and almost uniform official State practice to establish a substantial 
number of customary rules applicable to both types of conflict.55 As States continue to 
speak of international or non-international conflict we could not avoid such a 
classification, as the evaluation of customary law was based on practice, and we could 
not invent ideas, however useful such ideas might be. However, this does not prevent 
a consideration of what the situation should or could be.  
 
There is one major remaining difference in the customary law applicable to the two 
types of conflict, namely, the status of the parties. States are still adamant that rebel 
groups remain liable to prosecution for common crimes associated with their violent 
activities. This lack of POW status for fighters in non-international conflicts is the real 
reason why many States had been reluctant in the past to accept more rules for such 
conflicts. My experience with various negotiations to adopt new treaties in the 1990’s 
made this fact quite clear. As long as extensive provisions were adopted to ensure that 
no status could accrue to rebels, and no reason for intervention would result, then 
States accepted that these treaties applied to both international and non-international 
conflicts.56 
 
It is evident that combatant immunity (i.e. POW status) for actions not violating IHL 
needs to be maintained and that there is no chance at present of such status for rebel 
groups. Any suggestion for a combined set of rules applicable to any armed conflict 
needs to address this issue squarely. For this purpose it is useful to consider what the 
origin of POW status was. Initially it was accorded only to soldiers of an official 
army. As such these persons belonged to an organ of the State (the army being part of 
the executive). Immunity from prosecution for such military personnel was, and still 
is, the normal result of sovereign immunity from prosecution for violation of national 
crimes of another State. This rationale could be maintained to ensure immunity from 
prosecution for those representing a State, but not for other individuals. With regard 
                                                 
54
 J. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck “Customary International Humanitarian Law”, ICRC, CUP, 
2005. 
55
 If the study had been published a decade earlier, based on practice up until 1992, the result would 
have been very different, with far fewer rules also applicable to non-international conflicts. 
56
 See, e.g., Art. 1 of Amended Protocol II (1996) to the Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons, Art. 22 of Protocol II (1999) to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural 
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. Since then new weapons treaties apply at all times. 
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to some of the other categories of persons that have been accorded POW status since 
1899, we could consider groups or individuals fighting for the State, with the approval 
of that State,  as exercising the functions of the State, as described in Article 5, or 
even Article 11, of the Articles on State Responsibility.57 Although this document 
relates to State responsibility for unlawful acts, and not sovereign immunity, the 
immunities accorded by States are not immutable. They are, for example, extended to 
persons acting for an international organisation. It is just a question, therefore, of 
international agreement as to which persons or groups should benefit from this 
immunity. The fact that a government or State may not be recognised by another 
belligerent party would not make a difference to this, so that the effect of Article 4 (3) 
of the Third Geneva Convention would not be altered. With regard to some of the 
other civilian personnel included in Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention, in 
particular paragraph 5, it may well be that POW status is not particularly attractive. 
After all, this status entitles the other belligerent State to intern such persons for the 
whole length of the conflict, which could be decades. The lack of human rights law in 
1949 meant that POW status provided some security that was otherwise missing. This 
is not necessarily the case now. Indeed, as far as treatment is concerned, the 
provisions in the Geneva Conventions for all internees have since been largely 
provided by various international human rights instruments. This is important as 
para.5 of Art. 4 only provides for POW status for persons “who do not benefit by 
more favourable treatment under any other provisions of international law.” 
 
As not all States are yet party to all the relevant human rights treaties, whereas all are 
party to the Geneva Conventions, I am not suggesting that the protections of the 
Geneva Conventions are now irrelevant. Rather, I propose that all the rules that have 
been identified as customary for both international and non-international apply to all 
types of conflicts. Other protective rules applicable only to international conflicts 
should remain for such conflicts in order to avoiding losing what is presently still 
important. The special rules for combatant immunity for those acting on behalf of the 
State will remain as a manifestation of sovereign immunity. 
 
It needs to be remembered that the application of IHL confers not only protective 
rules, but also the entitlement to use force against fighters or, to be more accurate, 
such use of force would not be a violation of IHL. This fact means that the application 
of IHL is not necessarily to be advised in all situations of violence. This is why the 
threshold for non-international conflicts remains high, and also why the threshold for 
the use of force against non-State actors in self-defence needs to remain high. In fact 
the scenarios described in the definition of aggression in Article 3 of resolution 3314 
would not be a bad basis for the evaluation of the existence of an armed conflict for 
any cross-border activity, although it would need to include action also by an 
international organisation and not only by a State. Activities by non-State actors need 
to meet the existing threshold, and IHL should not apply to the problem of criminal 
                                                 
57
 UN International Law Commission, Draft Articles on State Responsiblity 2001, UN Doc. A/56/10, 
Supplement No. 10 (official records of the General Assembly). See also J. Crawford “The International 
Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility”, CUP, 2002. Article 5 reads as follows: “The 
conduct of a person or entity which is not an organ of the State…but which is empowered by the law of 
the State to exercise elements of governmental authority shall be considered an act of the State under 
international law, provided the person or entity is acting in that capacity in the particular instance”. ”. 
Article 11 reads as follows: “Conduct which is not attributable to a State under the preceding articles 
shall nevertheless be considered an act of State under international law if and to the extent that the 
State acknowledges and adopts the conduct in question as its own.” 
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activity having no political agenda whatsoever58 as this could imply the possibility to 
engage in an excessively dangerous use of force. 
 
 
4. Practical importance of human rights law to ensure implementation of IHL 
As a result of studies undertaken in the human rights context, for example, reports by 
UN Special Rapporteurs, Observations by human rights treaty bodies and various 
fact-finding reports, it has become increasingly evident that many serious violations 
of IHL occur because of disrespect for human rights in the countries concerned before 
the conflict. This is particularly true of the non-discrimination rule that is valid for 
IHL and human rights, as well as individual economic, social and civil rights which 
are common to both bodies of law. Additionally, freedom of expression, not provided 
for as such in IHL, is in practice important to ensure the implementation of IHL. The 
following will only touch on just a few aspects that illustrate this problem. 
 
Non-discrimination 
The requirement to respect IHL without discrimination can be subject to an almost 
insurmountable hurdle when the conflict itself is based on ethnic discrimination. The 
murder and displacement of civilians associated with so-called ethnic cleansing is the 
most obvious manifestation of this. However, inherent negative attitudes towards 
certain parts of the population will make the respect of almost all IHL rules that much 
more difficult or even impossible.59  
 
The problem with discrimination is that it is the product of attitudes, passed from one 
generation to another, and so firmly absorbed into the mentality of people that they 
may not even be aware of how biased they are. Even if the official law appears 
neutral, assumptions absorbed from childhood can prevent genuine equality in 
practice. This is normally referred to as “indirect discrimination”, which is 
particularly prevalent in the economic and social sphere.  
 
                                                 
58
 Although a policial agenda is not a criterion mentioned in any of the treaties or case-law defining a 
non-international conflict, in practice it has always been implied. The ICRC Commentary to Article 3 
confirms that States did not intend the expression “Party to a conflict” to include “common brigands” 
or mere “felons” (Commentary to Geneva Convention III, (ed. Pictet), 1960, pp. 32) and a study of 
situations classified as armed conflicts has shown that States insist on the respect of both human rights 
law and international humanitarian law in situations where the rebels have a political agenda. See, e.g., 
the annex to the study by I. Siatitsa and M. Titberidze, “Human rights in armed conflict from the 
perspective of the contemporary State practice in the United Nations: Factual answers to certain 
hypothetical challenges”, www.adh-geneve.ch/RULAC/pdf/Human-Rights-Law-in-Armed-
Conflict.pdf 
59
 See, e.g. references to the inherent problems of disadvantaged minorities and indiginous peoples in 
the Concluding Observations of the UN Committee for  Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR) on Chad, UN Doc. E/C.12/TCDE/CO/3, 29 November 2009, para. 7 ; on the Demoncratic 
Respublic of the Congo, UN Doc. E/C.12/COD/CO/4, 20 November 2009, paras. 15 and 17 ; and on 
the report submitted by UNMIK, UN Doc. E/C.12/UNK/CO/1, 21 November 2008, paras. 15, 17-18, 
21-22 and 32.  
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This has become very clear in the context of gender discrimination.60 Unfortunately, 
the issue of gender discrimination has been seen as marginal in the past, and in many 
places still is. This is a fundamental error. Quite apart from the injustice of this 
approach, it has become clear, including by a World Bank study,61 that it is the most 
important reason for the lack of development and poverty of many societies. This, in 
turn can frequently lead to conflict, thus further exacerbating economic problems, and 
indeed creating a vicious circle.  
 
IHL rules concentrate on the prohibition of rape and other sexual violence, as well as 
the care of maternity cases. Not only is this rather a narrow approach, but these rules 
are not respected because of gender discrimination. Studies have shown that pre-
existing attitudes contribute to such violations. As noted in the UN Secretary-
General’s report on women, peace and security: 
 
Where cultures of violence and discrimination against women and girls exist 
prior to conflict, they will be exacerbated during conflict.62 
 
In turn, such behaviour is based on long-term attitudes relating to the status of 
women: 
 
Violence against women throughout the life cycle derives essentially from 
cultural patterns, in particular the harmful effects of certain traditional or 
customary practices and all acts of extremism linked to race, sex, language or 
religion that perpetuate the lower status accorded to women in the family, the 
workplace, the community and society.63 
  
                                                 
60
 The meaning of “gender” and gender inequality is well described in General Comment 16 of the UN 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: “Gender refers to cultural expectations and 
assumptions about the behaviour, attitudes, personality traits, and physical and intellectual capacities of 
men and women, based solely on their identity as men or women. Gender-based assumptions and 
expectations generally place women at a disadvantage with respect to substantive enjoyment of rights, 
such as freedom to act and to be recognised as autonomous, fully capable adults, to participate fully in 
economic, social and political development, and to make decisions concerning their circumstances and 
conditions.  Gender-based assumptions about economic, social and cultural roles preclude the sharing 
of responsibility between men and women in all spheres that is necessary to equality.” The same 
General Comment notes this lack of equality in relation to many rights, concluding that women “are 
often denied equal enjoyment of their human rights, by virtue of the lesser status ascribed to them by 
tradition and custom or as a result of overt and covert discrimination”. CESCR, General Comment 16, 
“Article 3: the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment  of all economic, social and cultural 
rights”, 13 May 2005, §§ 4-5 and 14. 
 
61
 World Bank Policy Research Report: Engendering Development: Through Gender Equality in 
Rights, Resources and Voice, OUP 2001. 
62
 Report of the UN Secretary-General on women, peace and security, 16 Ocober 2002, UN Doc. 
S/2002/1154, § 5. 
63
 UN Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, 4-15 September 1995, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.177/20, 17 October 1995, Platform for Action § 118. See also the thorough study undertaken 
by the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Radhika 
Coomaraswamy, “Violence against women perpetrated and/or condoned by the State during times of 
armed conflict (1997-2000)”, 23 January 2001, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2001/73. 
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The result of this is that violence in peacetime is rarely addressed or punished, often 
being seen as a private affair, or even justifiable.64 Not surprisingly, against such a 
background, such violence multiplies with impunity during the chaos and stress of 
armed conflict. 
 
The same discrimination creates disproportionate economic hardship for women and 
prevents them from receiving appropriate humanitarian aid. The UN Secretary-
General’s report explains that gender inequality creates particular stress during armed 
conflict: 
 
With the loss of men and boys…through participation in armed forces, 
detention and disappearance, women and girls are forced to take on more 
responsibility for family security and well-being, often without the necessary 
resources or social support. Lack of land and property rights and lack of access 
to, or control over, resources, threaten women’s livelihoods.65 
 
As far as humanitarian aid is concerned, it has been pointed out that: 
 
A significant proportion of official and non-governmental aid fails to reach 
women survivors. Almost invariably, men are placed in charge of the 
decision-making process regarding humanitarian assistance and its 
distribution, despite the fact that women are generally far more experienced in 
food production, distribution and preparation than men. Consequently, women 
are frequently disadvantaged, either deliberately or because their needs are not 
properly understood.66 
 
The point relating to food is equally relevant for medical and hygiene supplies. The 
UN Secretary-General’s report therefore recommends that women be fully involved in 
the management of camps and in decision-making.67  
 
The link between gender inequality and violence, including in armed conflict, is 
recognised in a number of Concluding Observations of the UN Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,68 as well as treaties dedicated to the problem of 
violence against women.69 
                                                 
64
 See examples of such behaviour described in two human rights cases: ECtHR, Opuz v. Turkey, 
Judgment, 9 June 2009 and IACtHR, González et al. v. Mexico, Judgment, 16 November 2009.  
65
 Report of the UN Secretary-General on women, peace and security, 16 Ocober 2002, UN Doc. 
S/2002/1154, § 9. 
66
 Judith Gardam and Hilary Charlesworth, “Protection of Women in Armed Conflict”, Human Rights 
Quarterly, Vol. 22, 2000, p. 148, at pp.154-155. Some of these points are also addressed in: C. Lindsay, 
“Women facing war: ICRC Study on the impact of armed conflict on women” (ICRC 2001)  pp. 41, 88 
and 124. 
67
 Report of the UN Secretary-General on women, peace and security, 16 Ocober 2002, UN Doc. 
S/2002/1154, para. 51, and also para. 29 for peace operations. See also UNSC Res. 1889, 5 October 
2009, on the need for greater empowerment of women and practical measures to this effect. 
68
 CESCR,  Concluding Observations on Chad, UN Doc. E/C.12/TCDE/CO/3, 29 November 2009 ; on 
the Demoncratic Respublic of the Congo, UN Doc. E/C.12/COD/CO/4, 20 November 2009, on the 
report submitted by UNMIK, UN Doc. E/C.12/UNK/CO/1, 21 November 2008; on Columbia, UN 
Doc. E/C.12/COL/CO/5, 21 May 2010; on Afghanistan, UN Doc. E/C.12/AFG/CO/2-4, 21 May 2010.  
69
 Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against 
Women, 1994, in particular,  Arts. 6 and 9;  Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and 
Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence, 2011, in particular  preambular paras 10 
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Exploitation of children 
Attitudes towards children contribute to their exploitation in wartime.  Displacement 
is particularly dangerous for them. Machel’s report summed it up as follows: 
 
At least half of all refugees and displaced people are children…In the course 
of displacement, millions of children have been separated from their families, 
physically abused, exploited and abducted into military groups, or they have 
perished from hunger and disease.70 
 
Sexual exploitation of girls, and also some boys, takes advantage of their legal and 
practical vulnerability. Armed groups are also able to recruit children because of the 
children’s poverty. 71 Abuses against children show that no allowance is made for 
their age.72 Attitudes, especially for recruited girls, make reintegration into their 
families and communities difficult, or even impossible.73 The resulting psychological 
trauma of the younger generation may well lead to abuses by them in later conflicts. 
 
Treatment of wounded 
This is, of course, a very basic rule of IHL, dating back to the First Geneva 
Convention of 1864, with various developments culminating in the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and its three Protocols. The human rights equivalent is the right to life, 
which includes positive obligations to protect life,74 as well as the right to the highest 
attainable standard of health.75 Withholding necessary medical treatment also amounts 
to “inhuman treatment”.76 However, during the Arab Spring unrest, there have been 
reports of doctors and nurses being arrested and convicted to long prison sentences for 
treating wounded demonstrators.77 This kind of attitude could well be repeated in time 
of armed conflict. 
 
Disrespect for civil rights 
The stress created by armed conflict means that it is difficult to maintain certain 
standards during this time. There is a temptation, as we have seen in many instances, 
                                                                                                                                            
and Art. 2. Both treaties provide for measures to change attitudes and to ensure greater diligence in 
pursuing perpetrators of such violence. 
70
 Graça Machel, “Impact of armed conflict on children”, UN Doc. A/51/306, 26 August 1996, para. 
66. 
71
 Ibid. paras. 38-48. 
72
 See, in particular, the condemnation by UNSC Res. 1539, 22 April 2004, para. 1, of serious abuses 
committed against children in armed conflict. 
73
 See, e.g. UNICEF: “The Paris Principles : Principles and Guidelines on children associated with 
armed forces or armed groups”, February 2007, paras. 7.30-7.34,  7.37-7.43 and  7.59-7.67. 
74
 All the human rights treaty bodies have interpreted the right to life as including such positive 
measures. With regard to treating the wounded during armed conflict, see, e.g. ECtHR, Ahmed Özkan 
and Others v. Turkey, Judgment, 6 April 2004, §§ 307-308; ECtHR, Varnava and Others v. Turkey, 
Judgment, 18 September 2009, § 185; IACtHR, Neira Alegria et al. v. Peru, Judgment, 19 January 
1995, § 74.  
75
 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Art. 12. Withholding medical 
treatment from particular individuals or groups is an egregious violation of the duty to respect this 
right: CESCR, General Comment 14, 11 August 2000, UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/4, para. 50. 
76
 AComHPR, Huri-Laws v. Nigeria, Com. 225/98, 6 November 2000, § 41; ECtHR, Istratii and 
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including actions after 9/11, to believe that such standards should be dropped in the 
face of emergency. There is, therefore, the need to reinforce the compulsory character 
of many of these rights, such as the prohibition of torture, the right to a fair trial and 
the compulsory registration of detainees to prevent disappearance. The Geneva 
Conventions are crucially important to stress that these standards must be maintained, 
and to provide mechanisms to help this.  
 
However, what is less talked of is the fact that such standards cannot be implemented 
in armed conflict if they did not exist in the countries concerned beforehand. A few 
examples will illustrate this: 
 
• Prohibition of torture 
Unfortunately, in many countries it is standard procedure to base criminal convictions 
on confessions. The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment describes the implications of this as follows: 
 
“It is self-evident that a criminal justice system which places a premium on 
confession evidence creates incentives for officials involved in the 
investigation of crime – and often under pressure to obtain results – to use 
physical or psychological coercion …it is of fundamental importance to 
develop methods of crime investigation capable of reducing reliance on 
confessions…”78 
 
It is evident that the other methods of investigation referred to here include the 
analysis of objective data such as forensic evidence. It is highly unlikely that countries 
that rely primarily or entirely on forcing confessions will suddenly become proficient 
in the collection and analysis of other data once an armed conflict breaks out. 
 
In addition, human rights studies have proved that the most dangerous time for a 
detained person is the first hours after capture. Therefore human rights bodies have 
established ways that help prevent torture: insisting on the presence of a lawyer from 
the outset and during any interrogation,79 the recording of interrogations,80 and access 
to a doctor on arrival and thereafter whenever requested.81 If these measures are not a 
habit in peacetime, they will hardly be implemented in wartime. Unfortunately, IHL 
does not require these measures expressly, but IHL specialists should be aware that 
they are necessary to prevent torture. 
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 The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CPT), 12th General Report [CPT/Inf (2002)15], para. 35. 
79
 E.g. Ibid. para. 41 and CPT 6th General Report [CPT/Inf (96) 21], para. 15; UN Human Rights 
Council Res. 13/19, 26 March 2010, adopted by consensus, paras. 5 and 6;  UN Body of Principles for 
the Protection of all Persons under any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, adopted by UNGA Res. 
43/173, 9 December 1988 (UN Body of Principles on Detention), Principle 17, European Prison Rules, 
2006, para. 98; ECtHR, Salduz v. Turkey, Judgment, 27 November 2008, para. 54; African 
Commission Resolution on  Guidelines and Measures for the Prohibition and Prevention of Torture, 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Africa (African Guidelines to Prevent 
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80
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• Prohibition of enforced disappearance 
Although this prohibition is not articulated in IHL treaty law as such, it is clearly 
prohibited because it amounts to a combination of other violations, in particular, 
murder, lack of registration of prisoners, incommunicado detention, probably torture, 
and lack of any procedural rights. In this regard, IHL treaty law applicable to 
international conflicts is better than that for non-international conflicts. However, 
once again, if the conditions that favour enforced disappearance are present in 
peacetime situations, then the likelihood of its occurring in armed conflict is that 
much greater. The International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance (ICED) lists the main measures that are required to help 
prevent this phenomenon. These are a distillation of relevant existing treaty law, 
together with its interpretation by case-law. The measures include the requirement to 
keep detained persons in officially-recognised and supervised centres, the keeping of 
detailed official registers, the right for a detainee to communicate with family, lawyer 
and, if a foreigner, consular authorities, and the right to take proceedings to establish 
the lawfulness of detention by the detained person or his family.82 An absence of 
these in peacetime does not bode well for detained persons in wartime. 
 
• Right to fair trial 
The right to fair trial is not only provided for by Common Article 3, but also in more 
detail in the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions and the two 1977 Additional 
Protocols. Ensuring a fair trial necessitates not only the fundamental element of an 
independent and impartial tribunal, but also a host of other attributes that will ensure 
equality of arms between the parties concerned. This requires an effective defence 
that includes proper access to documents, reliable evidence and the means to counter 
prosecution arguments. The prohibition of using evidence obtained by torture is part 
of this requirement.83 All this involves a sophisticated apparatus that cannot exist 
without extensive prior training and mechanisms in place. Most crucially, it requires a 
mentality that recognises the principle of innocence until proved guilty through fair 
procedures. This was recognised in 1949 through the wording of Common Article 3 
which required judgments to be pronounced by a “regularly constituted court, 
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognised as indispensable by 
civilized peoples”. The last words have since been dropped because of their offensive 
connotation, but the original meaning, namely, the level of sophistication required, 
does reflect what a fair trial requires.84  
 
Unfortunately, a myriad of cases brought before international human rights treaty 
bodies have shown the degree to which this right has not been properly respected. 
This is particularly the case where there is insufficient separation between the judicial 
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and executive branches of government. Once again, such shortfalls are hardly going to 
be remedied during an armed conflict.  
 
• Right to freedom of expression 
Freedom of Expression includes the right to not only impart information but also to 
receive it.85This is a human right that is clearly absent in IHL as such, and yet several 
aspects of IHL implementation would be difficult to achieve without it.  
 
The most obvious point is that IHL requires governments to disseminate its provisions 
not only to the army but also, as far as possible, to the civilian population.86 This 
clearly implies a right to receive such information.  
 
More significantly, the required repression of IHL violations cannot take place in 
most cases without the ability to report on suspected violations. This is clearly the 
case within the army where a commander would need to be informed by someone if a 
violation is being or had been committed.87 The required refusal to carry out a 
manifestly unlawful act also implies that the soldier at the receiving end of the order 
has the right to express this.88 However, the issue is not limited to the army. 
Information on war crimes is often uncovered by investigative journalists, and such 
information must be able to be published if war crimes are to be punished and 
measures taken to avoid a repetition. A case to this effect came before the European 
Court of Human Rights in which a journalist from Azerbaijan was convicted for 
publishing information showing that some war crimes were committed by its own 
soldiers. Freedom of expression, like the other human rights freedoms, are subject to 
possible limitations in national law provided that they are genuinely necessary and 
proportionate to the aim required, such as national security. This was not the case in 
this instance. As the European Court said: “…it is essential in a democratic society 
that a debate on the causes of acts of particular gravity which may amount to war 
crimes or crimes against humanity should be able to take place freely”.89 An 
atmosphere of repression during peacetime is likely to continue, and indeed get worse, 
during wartime. 
 
What should IHL specialists make of this information 
The first point, I think, is for IHL specialists to feel less apologetic about the 
violations that do occur, given that many of these stem from conditions beforehand. I 
am not one of those that believe that IHL is almost always violated, as conformity 
with the rules often means the abstention from certain actions. However, it is best to 
be clear about why there is so much difficulty in ensuring the respect of many rules, at 
least in the context of a number of armed conflicts. A novel approach could be, 
therefore, that where rules of IHL and human rights law are the same, efforts to 
respect human rights law in peacetime may be seen as preparation for a proper respect 
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of IHL. This is because, as stressed above, many IHL requirements cannot be created 
overnight, but need to be embedded in the culture and long-term practice of a society 
at all times. 
 
In cases where human rights law is not reflected in rules of IHL directly, it would be 
wise to recognise the value of human rights in order to help enforce IHL. This 
includes, for example, logical deductions made by human rights bodies, such as the 
need to investigate possible violations of the right to life, which is not spelled out in 
human rights treaties, but which makes sense to ensure its implementation. All this 
reinforces the need to ensure respect for both human rights and IHL. Arguments that 
one can function well without the other do not stand up.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The effect of armed measures on non-governmental actors based abroad, and the 
increasing availability of armed drones, means that international law is facing a 
fundamental choice. The bottom line is whether we want to create a world that is 
more peaceful or more violent. No one can deny the right of a country to defend itself 
against invasion or serious attack. However, in order to avoid a culture of using force 
to try to solve problems, which it cannot, it is the responsibility of international 
lawyers to remind the world of what post-Charter international law was supposed to 
be about, namely, the creation of international peace and security. This is still the aim 
that needs to be worked towards. The world is now so much more interconnected than 
in 1945 that it has helped the spread of international terrorist activity. By the same 
token, however, our present day inter-dependency means that it is not viable to go 
back to nineteenth century modalities on the use of force. Unfortunately, violence 
usually creates more violence, together with social and economic upheaval. 
 
IHL is only meant to be a stop-gap to prevent the total descent into absolute barbarism 
and destruction. Ideally it should not be necessary at all. At the moment it is much 
more present than it ought to be. By that I mean that far more armed force is being 
used than it should be. Too many internal conflicts are being created by social unrest 
through an insufficient genuine desire to respect human rights. What I am trying to 
say here is that IHL specialists should not imagine that this branch of international 
law can exist and be properly implemented without reference to other branches of 
international law. A lack of a human rights culture will in practice prevent the proper 
respect of IHL. A lack of genuine belief in the need to prevent inter-State force 
motivates States to justify such force on the basis that there is a non-international 
conflict. When a State attacks the territory of another it has created an international 
conflict. Non-recognition of this fact merely plays into the hands of those wishing to 
weaken the rules preventing inter-State force. 
 
IHL faces many challenges and difficulties, and unfortunately, others are likely to 
develop in the future. I would encourage lawyers not to be so blinded by dogmas that 
they forget what the original reasons for certain rules were. An example of this is the 
rigid distinction between international and non-international conflict, and the 
supposed equality of the parties in the latter. This needs honest re-examination. 
Whatever the challenge, it is crucial to keep in mind what the law is ultimately trying 
to achieve. On this basis I hope that international lawyers can courageously defend the 
fundamental aim of peace and human dignity and what is required to this end.  
